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Radical Pluralism and Free Speech in Online 
Public Spaces: the Case of North-Belgian 
Extreme Right Discourses 
 
Bart Cammaerts 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
Progressive political movements and activists are not the only ones appropriating 
Web 2.0 as a way to construct independent public spaces and voice counter-
hegemonic discourses. By looking at the other extreme of (post-)fascist movements, 
it will be shown that the internet also gives rise to anti-public spaces, voicing hatred 
and essentialist discourses. In this article, discourses of hate produced by North-
Belgian (post-)fascist movements and activists will be analysed. Theoretically the 
analysis is informed by radical pluralism and the limits of freedom of speech in a 
strong democracy. The cases presented challenge the limits of freedom of speech 
and of radical pluralism and bring us to question whether being a racist is a 
democratic right, whether freedom of speech includes opinions and views that 
challenge basic democratic values. 
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Radical Pluralism and Free Speech in Online 
Public Spaces: the Case of North-Belgian 
Extreme Right Discourses 
 
 
You think that a wall as solid as the earth separates civilisation from barbarism. I tell 
you the division is a thread, a sheet of glass. A touch here, a push there, and you 
bring back the reign of Saturn. (Buchan, 1916) 
 
 
In this article a case study illustrating the way in which the internet serves as a 
platform for the incitement of racial hatred and discrimination against 
minorities is presented. More specifically, hate speech in North-Belgian blogs 
and an online forum will be analysed. This will be related to recent debates 
regarding the internet and public spaces, rationality versus passions, the 
distinction between antagonism and agonism (Mouffe, 1999) and freedom of 
speech. In this article the focus will be on ‘communities of closure’ (Couldry, 
2002) or anti-publics, ‘placing themselves at the political extremes […] 
challeng[ing] or question[ing] basic democratic values’ (Cammaerts, 2007: 
73).  
 
As critical scholars we often tend to focus on progressive emancipatory 
resistance movements first and foremost, and in doing so we underscore the 
extensive use of the internet (as well as other media) by non-progressive 
reactionary movements, be it the radical and dogmatic Catholic movement, 
the fundamentalist Muslim movement or the extreme right – post-fascist – 
movement. As Kahn and Kellner (2004: 94) quite rightly point out ‘the internet 
is a contested terrain, used by Left, Right, and Center of both dominant 
cultures and subcultures in order to promote their own agendas and interests’. 
A notable exception to this pre-dominant focus on progressive politics is Atton 
(2004/2006) who addresses the use of alternative (new) media by the 
extreme-right movement in the UK and the US. Downing et al. (2001: 89) also 
distinguish between democratic and repressive radical media, the latter 
having ‘neither critical reflection nor any genuine increase in personal or 
collective freedom … on the radar screen’.  
 
Inevitably the hate-speech debate also brings into question ideological 
differences in relation to the how absolute freedom of speech is, the nature of 
democracy and how or to what extent a balance needs to be struck between 
different rights, including respect for and recognition of difference and the right 
not to be discriminated against. 
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2 An online public sphere or public spaces online 
 
The rise of the internet as an interactive space, potentially global in reach, has 
led to an increasing number of scholars asserting the relevance or indeed 
irrelevance of the internet for the promotion of a democratic public sphere and 
for the facilitation of deliberation (Wilhelm, 2000; Gimmler, 2001; Dahlberg, 
2001; Young, 2001; Poster, 2001; Downey and Fenton, 2003; Dean, 2003; 
Dahlgren, 2005; Cammaerts, 2005). This has clearly re-invigorated debates 
regarding the public sphere and linked to that the potentials of the internet to 
foster a public sphere or public spaces beyond state and market that facilitate 
deliberation.  
 
From a post-modern perspective, Villa (1992: 712) describes the public 
sphere as ‘a discursive arena that is home to citizen debate, deliberation, 
agreement and action’. Deliberation is, however, very much entrenched in the 
Enlightment tradition rather then post-modernism. It points to a process of 
communication and dialogue, involving different ‘equal’ actors aimed at 
reaching a rational consensus. It is thus seen as a democratic process 
informed by rational argumentative debate, respect for difference and the 
ability to change views based on sound rational counter-arguments 
(Benhabib, 1996: 96). 
 
The internet is by some perceived as an ideal (new) platform to realise 
genuine deliberation. Coleman and Gøtze (2001: 17) for instance assert that 
the internet ‘makes manageable largescale, many-to-many discussion and 
deliberation’. Contrary to this, much of empirical research on the relationship 
between the internet and deliberation (or public debate for that matter) tends 
to counter the rather optimistic claims that the internet stimulates and 
facilitates the emergence of an online public sphere. First and foremost, 
almost becoming a disclaimer, the digital divide remains problematic in 
relation to free access for all (Cammaerts, et al., 2003). True, penetration 
rates in the West – particularly of broadband – have soared in recent years, 
but this does not mean that all and everyone has easy and equal access to 
the internet or a computer, nor to capabilities in the way Sen conceives them 
(see Garnham, 2000).  
 
Regarding the potentials of the internet in view of fostering democracy and 
facilitating public debate or dialogue, Norris (2001: 12) speaks of a democratic 
divide between ‘those who do and do not use the multiple political resources 
available on the internet for civic engagement’. This creates imbalances, 
whereby those that participate offline, also do so online. This leads Dahlberg 
(2001: 10) to conclude that participation in online public debates ‘is, in fact, 
both quantitatively and qualitatively dominated by those already powerful 
offline (politically active, educated, white, males).’ More recently, King (2006: 
26) confirmed that ‘those people participating in political issues on the Internet 
were highly educated and already highly politically engaged persons’.  
 
In addition to pointing to issues of access and addressing the crucial question 
as to who participates in online public debates, many scholars challenge or at 
least question the potential of the internet to facilitate and enable (rational) 
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deliberation within an ideal speech situation. A recurrent observation is that 
much debate on the internet tends to take place between like-minded (male) 
participants situated in homogenic ideological frameworks and engaging in, 
what Davies (1999: 162) calls ‘opinion reinforcement’ and Wilhelm (2000: 89) 
‘homophily’. On the contrary, ideologically heterogeneous unmoderated 
spaces for debate, while being more open, are often confronted with flame-
wars between (often anonymous) participants (Eum, 2005; Cammaerts, 2005: 
70). 
 
Finally, some authors also address the dangers of individualisation, alienation, 
isolation and fragmentation, which – according to them - are increased by 
ICTs (Postman, 1992; Gitlin, 1998). New media facilitate the catering to 
specific niche-markets, characterised by a pull-strategy, which promotes the 
segmentation of publics, ‘disadvantag[ing] deliberation and the pursuit of 
common ground and undermin[ing] the politics of democratic participation’ 
(Barber, 2003: 45). 
 
While many proponents of digital culture and technological advancement 
seem to argue that the internet has all the requirements to be a 
Habermassian public sphere, others – such as many authors cited above, 
argue the contrary or are more cautious in their assessment. This leads us to 
argue that the real question here is maybe not whether the internet constitutes 
a public sphere, but should relate to the inaptness of the normative 
Habermassian public sphere notion at a theoretical level to account for current 
political and social processes in highly mediatised and popular culture driven 
societies.  
 
Countering the Habermassian public sphere and rational deliberation, 
Connolly (1991) and Mouffe (1999) advocate a radically pluralist and agonistic 
democracy. They argue for an agonistic conception of the political which 
recognises ideological differences, societal tensions and conflicts of interest 
— always present in every society, and in which ‘others’ are constructed as 
legitimate adversaries rather then enemies. Agonism refers to a struggle of 
conflicting idea’s - ‘a vibrant clash of democratic political positions’ (Mouffe, 
2000: 16), but at the same time also to a common frame of democratic 
principles, respecting ‘the other’ in their otherness with ‘a shared adhesion to 
the ethico-political principles of democracy’ (Mouffe, 1999: 755). The aim of 
democracy, according to Mouffe (1999: 755), should then be ‘to transform an 
“antagonism” into an “agonism”’.  
 
According to the conflictual approach in political theory, deliberative 
democracy eliminates or eradicates power and conflict from the political in a 
bid to achieve a rational consensus shared by all participants to the 
deliberative process.  
 
I am particularly interested in the role of what I call ‘‘passions’’ in 
politics. For Habermas, this is exactly what the public sphere should 
not be; it is not the place where passions should be expressed. (…) 
Public spaces should be places for the expression of dissensus, for 
 5 
bringing to the floor what forces attempt to keep concealed. (Mouffe 
quoted in: Carpentier & Cammaerts, 2006: 973-4) 
 
Clearly the internet can be seen as providing opportunities for constructing 
public spaces online, but just as the ‘offline’ public sphere is deemed 
problematic on many accounts, so is an online public sphere. By speaking of 
an ‘online public sphere’ a normative distinction is introduced between what is 
being considered good and real democratic discourses – rational, focussed on 
the common good, consensual, etc. and what is deemed non-political, titter-
tatter in the margins or passionate individual expressions without much value, 
thereby ‘homogeniz[ing] political engagement, neutraliz[ing] social space, and 
sanitiz[ing] popular cultures’ (Dean, 2001: 346-7). In doing so, much of what is 
happing online which might not seem rational or having an impact on politics, 
is being disregarded. It could be argued that this 'multiplicity of voices that a 
pluralist society encompasses' (Mouffe, 1999: 757) is beneficial for a vibrant 
(online) civic culture (Dahlgren, 2005) and a strong democracy (Barber, 
1984).  
 
The diversity of content out there needs to be recognised for its political 
potentials and valued accordingly, without restricting or limiting the political in 
advance. One of the questions raised here, however, is to which extent this 
form of ‘radical pluralism’ is tenable when taken to its extremes. Ethics and 
normativity inevitably resurge when confronted with anti-publics; those using 
their right of freedom of speech to incite hatred and acting in essence with an 
antagonistic agenda towards democracy and its core values.  
 
 
3. Freedom of speech: an essentially contested right 
 
It could be argued that while freedom of speech is considered one of the 
cornerstones of a democracy, it is at the same time also one of the most 
contested rights. The recent Danish cartoons controversy depicting the 
prophet Muhammad, deemed to be blasphemous by Sunni Muslims, is a case 
in point (Sturges, 2006; Post, 2007). From a liberal and rather procedural 
perspective on democracy, freedom of speech and the press needs to be 
almost absolute, preventing state interference in determining which speech is 
acceptable and which not (Dworkin, 1994). However, in democratic societies 
embedded in the social responsibility tradition, freedom of speech is more 
carefully weighed against other rights and protections and considered relative 
rather then absolute (Lichtenberg, 1990).  
 
The US First Amendment of the Constitution epitomises the absolutist 
perspective. It states that ‘Congress shall make no law … abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press’. Embedded in a tradition of individualism 
and libertarianism, and a firm belief in the need for citizens to be protected 
from the state, the freedom to be able to say what on wants, when and how, is 
sacred. However, by protecting the content of all speech in such an absolute 
way, ‘the action that the speech performs’ (Butler, 1997: 72) is not taken into 
consideration. As such, fairly rigid dichotomy is being constructed between 
the marketplace of ideas and social action. Furthermore, the First Amendment 
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discourse has become truly hegemonic – a dogmatic ideology in itself, which 
leads Schauer (1995: 13) to argue that there is ‘little free thought about free 
thought, little free inquiry about free inquiry and little free speech about free 
speech’.  
 
Although freedom of speech is undeniably a highly valued right of any 
democracy, it does not take priority over all other rights and liberties at all 
times, not even in the US. Anti-defamation legislation, laws against obscenity, 
consumer and even copyright protection illustrate this clearly. Furthermore, in 
the 1950s and beyond the freedom of speech for US socialists and 
communists was seriously curtailed (Rosenfeld, 2001: 12). Concerning the 
relationship between freedom of speech and hate speech the issues are, 
however, much more complicated. While incitement to violence is outlawed, 
hate speech is protected by the First Amendment doctrine. In this regard, 
Matsuda (1993: 31-32) points out that ‘people are free to think and say what 
they want, even the unthinkable. They can advocate the end of democracy’, 
and furthermore ‘expressions of the ideas of racial inferiority or racial hatred 
are protected’.  
 
The claim by Schauer that there is very little free speech about the freedom of 
speech and Matsuda’s argument that even the end of democracy can be 
called for, are not entirely convincing, even within the liberal paradigm and the 
procedural view of democracy. Popper’s ‘paradox of tolerance’ is a good 
example of this. According to Popper (1965: 265) an open and tolerant society 
cannot survive if tolerance is unlimited: 
 
‘Unlimited tolerance must lead to the disappearance of tolerance. If we 
extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are 
not prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the 
intolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them.’ 
 
The harm-principle, initially introduced by Mill, himself a strong advocate of 
free speech and liberalism also attests to the existence of debate within the 
liberal free speech tradition. The harm-principle stipulates the conditions 
under which among others free speech could be curtailed: ‘the only purpose 
for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized 
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others’. (Mill, 1978: 9). 
However, given his liberal background, ‘doing harm to others’ has to be seen 
here in an individualistic sense and does not extend to collective harm. Much 
of hate speech would be allowed, as it is argued that it does not provoke 
direct harm to another individual.  
 
Opposed to an individualised and formalised conception of democracy and 
free speech - detached from action and conceiving ‘the commons’ as a 
marketplace of ideas, is the notion of democracy as a process, as ‘a promise 
… the endless process of improvement and perfectability …’ (Derrida, 1997: 
5). Democracy is thus not merely a method for decision-making and electing 
ruling elites (Schumpeter, 1973), but embedded in everyday life and practices 
and concerned with values such as equality, protection against the market, 
freedom of speech and social responsibility, leading to a social contract 
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between the citizen and the state (Rousseau, 1977). This more positive 
emancipatory perception of the state has led to a more balanced and 
relativistic approach to freedom of speech. As such, in many countries a 
collective – rather then an individualistic – harm-principle prevails over the 
freedom of speech principle allowing for direct (legal) intervention when it 
concerns racism and discrimination. In addition to this, Feinberg’s (1985) 
offence-principle is also often invoked by advocates of limits to free speech. 
Even within the tradition of radical democracy where a radical pluralism of 
idea’s and voices is deemed beneficial for democracy, a hegemony of basic 
democratic values is considered crucial. Echoing Popper, but clearly from 
another political paradigm, Mouffe (2005: 120) argues that ‘[a] democracy 
cannot treat those who put its basic institutions into question as legitimate 
adversaries.’. 
 
As a result of this and contrary to the US, many European countries as well as 
countries such as Canada, Brazil, Australia and New Zealand have adopted 
quite stringent legislation to counter hate-speech and the incitement of racial 
and ethnic hatred. Some countries also voted legislation outlawing holocaust 
denial or revisionist discourses. In Germany parties with a fascist ideology can 
be forbidden.  
 
Finally, the internet plays an increasingly intricate role in current debates 
regarding freedom of speech. The internet exposes the differences in 
conceptions of freedom of speech across the world as netizens in one 
location can access as well as upload content in another location. It has to be 
stressed though that the impact of the global internet and blogs on these 
national or regional cultural differences regarding what constitutes freedom of 
speech is both problematic and empowering at the same time. The internet 
potentially enables dissident and radical voices and discourses to bypass 
state control in countries with an autoritharian model of governance, 
dictatorships or one-party systems such as China and Birma. The increase in 
internet-filtering by these regimes attests to the potency of the internet in this 
regard1. Similarly, the internet also enables anti-publics to disseminate hate-
speech. The focus here is on this other – darker – side of the coin.  
 
 
4. Case-study: the use of blogs and forums by the North-Belgian post-
fascist movement 
 
4.1 Brief Context 
 
The North-Belgian post-fascist movement is characterised by a carefully 
constructed balance between a strong focus on law and order, a populist anti-
immigrant – mainly Islamophobic – agenda and a call for the break-up of 
Belgium (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007). Its main proponent is the party Vlaams 
Belang, formerly known as Vlaams Blok. In 2004 Vlaams Blok revamped itself 
to Vlaams Belang after a conviction by the Belgian Supreme Court on the 
basis of racism and discrimination (Hof van Beroep, 2004). 
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With about 20% of the popular vote on a regional level and more then 30% in 
the biggest North-Belgian city Antwerp, Vlaams Belang is currently the second 
biggest party in the North of Belgium. The historical roots of Vlaams Belang 
go back to the collaboration of large parts of the Flemish nationalist 
movement with the German Nazi-regime during WW-II (Witte, et al, 1997). 
While less apparent now, this is nevertheless still relevant as this dark past 
and its current articulations regularly causes embarrassment to the party, 
which incidentally has never unequivocally broken with that dubious past and 
those that glorify it in the present.  
 
Three events in 2006 are of particular interest here. In April of 2006, a local 
youngster was murdered in broad daylight in the hall of Brussels Central 
Station after he had refused to hand over his mp3-player. A month later 
Antwerp was left in shock after a brutal racist murder in the streets of 
Antwerp. A young man with an extreme right background killed a Caucasian 
baby and her black minder and wounded a Turkish woman. Again about a 
month later, a man died of a cerebral haemorrhage after a skirmish with some 
youngsters of Moroccan descent on a local bus in Antwerp.  
 
12 April 2006 Murder Joe Van Holsbeek (Brussels) 
12 May 2006 Murder Oulematou Niangadou and 
Luna Drowart (Antwerp) 
24 June 2006 Death Guido Demoor (Antwerp) 
 
These three events, while very distinct in one way, came to be seen in relation 
to one another, not merely because they happened in a short period of time, 
but also because of the public debate and outcry, as well as racist discourses 
they produced.  
 
Since 1981 discrimination on the grounds of race, skin colour or national or 
ethnical descent is illegal in Belgium, as is the incitement of racial hatred and 
propagation of hate speech. In addition to this, in 1995 the Belgian Parliament 
outlawed holocaust denial or negationism. All this is policed by a vigilant 
watchdog – the Belgian Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to 
Racism (CGKR). In its capacity of watchdog, the CGKR also started-up a 
complaints website for racism on the internet called ‘Cyberhate.be’. It receives 
on average some 30 complaints per month most of which fall into three main 
categories: 1) racism on discussion forums and chat sites (on sites that do not 
have a racist background), 2) racist websites (such as Stormfront, but also 
Blood & Honour for example) and 3) racist chain letters or PowerPoint 
presentations (Sofie D’Huster, e-mail interview, 21/05/2007). Racism on the 
internet is on the increase in Belgium, prompting some politicians both in the 
South and the North of the country to call for intervention by media 
organisations, the government and/or by Europe (De Standaard, 2008; 
Schelfhout en Van Den Driessche, 2008).  
 
In what follows, examples of online extreme right discourses will be presented 
relating to the three events outlined above. These discourses were produced 
by individual bloggers or by contributors to an online forum of a US 
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organisation called Stormfront – the Dutch speaking part of this ‘white 
nationalist community’ forum is very active and militant.  
 
4.2 Racist discourses in online public spaces 
 
The discourses of hate relating to these three events are quite shocking. The 
examples below are of course self-selected and thus serve as an illustration 
of discursive transgressions and nothing more. The argument is easily made 
that these are marginalised voices and ideas that are present in each society 
and now find an outlet on the internet. Given the fragmentary nature of the 
‘World Wide’ Web, you will not encounter such harsh and wounding language, 
unless you specifically look for it or are directed to it. Nevertheless, given the 
specific North-Belgian context where such ideas are at least implicitly 
supported and promoted by the second biggest political party, this poses a 
direct threat to democracy itself. As will be shown, free speech and the spirit 
of democracy is also being used against democracy itself and its basic values. 
The question thus becomes of an even more complex nature; can/should a 
democracy defend itself against such anti-democratic forces and discourses 
and if so, how, in what circumstances, to what extent? 
 
4.2.1 Murder of Joe Van Holsbeek (12/04/2006) 
 
Joe Van Holsbeek (17), was murdered by Polish kids in broad daylight in the 
hall of the very busy Brussels Central Station. He was stabbed several times 
after he refused to hand over his MP3-player. Witness reports, the police, as 
well as the mainstream media, implied that the perpetrators were youngsters 
of North-African descent and public opinion quickly followed suit, condemning 
the murder, but by extension also the large Moroccan community in Belgium. 
In the extreme-right forums and weblogs there was also no doubt what so 
ever that those responsible for the death of Joe were of North-African 
descent.  
 
‘I hope finally someone will take the problem serious, and realise that 
those North African thugs are not worth our care and concern.’ 
(BelgianWanderer, post on Stormfront, 20/04/20062) 
 
‘That the perpetrators are of (North) African descent isn’t surprising, 
only the contrary would be.’ (Wehrwolf_VL, post on Stormfront, 
17/04/2006, own translation3) 
 
One quite influential right-wing commentator and ideologue, Paul Belien, 
called upon whites to arm themselves. On a collective blog 
(www.brusselsjournal.com) Belien (2006 - own translation and emphasis 
added), an ex-journalist with strong links to Vlaams Belang, asked to ‘give us 
weapons’, because he claims: 
 
‘The predators have knives … From a very young age they have 
learned to kill warm-blooded animals during the yearly Sacrifice Feast. 
We become sick when seeing blood, but not them. They are trained, 
they are armed … The bastards who got everything in our society – 
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free education, childcare benefits, social security – are today killing our 
children for an mp3 player.’  
 
This posting shows how at a discursive level a clear distinction is being drawn 
between the identity of the self and ‘the other’, whereby ‘we/our’ is being 
construed as good and morally just while ‘they/them’ are being projected as 
evil, dangerous and even sub-human. The latter is illustrated by the use of 
predator, animals that kill and eat other animals. It concurs with the common 
perception that ‘positive self-representation and negative other-presentation 
are fundamental argumentative strategies for legitimisation and persuasion by 
the political right’ (Charteris-Black, 2006: 566). 
 
Figure 1: Screen-Shot of the blog ‘The Brussels Journal’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://www.brusselsjournal.com (Retrieved 10/11/2007) 
 
After a complaint was filed against him through the CGKR for inciting racial 
hatred and an interview by the police, Belien removed the above quoted blog 
post. It now reads: ‘This text was removed on demand of the CGKR … 
Although I deny the charges, I will comply to this request’ (Belien, 2006 - own 
translation) 
 
Another concern being raised by many, including the Belgian Arch-Bishop and 
the prime minister was the indifference of people witnessing the murder, the 
fact that nobody intervened during the fight that preceded the fatal stabs and 
that those responsible were able to flee without anyone stopping them. On the 
Stormfront forum this sentiment was shared, leading to accusations of 
cowardice behaviour by ‘the own race’.  
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‘Besides the cowardly politicians, we should also point to all those 
white cowards who are present in their ten thousands in Brussels-
Central station every day, of whom nobody ‘saw anything’ or had the 
guts to intervene.’ (Wehrwolf_VL, post on Stormfront, 17/04/2006 – 
own translation4). 
 
In the forum, vile language towards the parents of Joe, who refused to get 
carried away by the essentialist mood in the media or online blogs and 
forums, could also be observed. One poster to the Stormfront forum accused 
them of treason to their own race and of abusing their son’s death for political 
ends; ‘These traitors consciously offer their son to the ‘multicultus’’ (Duchess, 
post on Stormfront 22/04/2006 – own translation5). Under impulse of a 
politician of Moroccan descent and the parents of Joe a so-called white (non-
political) march was held. 80.000 people took to the streets in commemoration 
of Joe and against violence in society (De Morgen, 2006a). 
 
Two weeks after the murder the police revealed that the perpetrators were not 
North African, but rather of Polish descent. The Federal police even issued a 
formal apology towards the North-African community in Belgium. 
 
We regret it that the North-African community was immediately 
accused shortly after the murder, certainly as it now appears that the 
perpetrators are not from that community. (Audenaert, 2006 – own 
translation) 
 
For some days after this announcement, a discussion was waged on the 
Stormfront forum doubting the authenticity of these claims. When it appeared 
that the Polish youngsters were gypsies, the rant on the forum continued.   
 
4.2.2 Murder of Oulematou Niangadou and Luna Drowart (12/05/2006) 
 
One month after the murder of Joe Van Holsbeke, a 19-year old Belgian with 
an extreme right family background shot down three people in the streets of 
Antwerp. Hans Van Temsche wounded a Turkish woman and subsequently 
killed a woman of African descent and the white baby she was minding, after 
which he was shot and arrested by the police. This very act sent shock waves 
through the Belgian society, not used to street shootings at all.  
 
Guy Verhofstadt, the then Prime Minister, was quick to link these murders to 
the extreme right ideology that drives and is being promoted by Vlaams 
Belang. In a press release he stated: ‘These dreadful, cowardly murders are a 
form of extreme racism. It has to be clear for everybody now to what the 
extreme right leads’ (Verhofstadt quoted in De Morgen, 2006b - own 
translation). Not unsurprisingly these murders also caused, maybe for the 
very first time, real panic in the extreme-right movement. 
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Figure 2: Screen-Shot of the online forum ‘Stormfront’ – Dutch version 
 
Source: http://www.stormfront.org (Retrieved 10/11/2007) 
 
The first postings after this event on the Stormfront forum shared this pre-
occupation of being associated with these racist murders. Specifically the 
mainstream media was being targeted for strategically linking these cruel 
murders to the extreme right ideology and having a left wing bias.  
 
‘If this is true, it is very bad. Undoubtedly the leftish press is ready to 
call Vlaams Belang co-responsible because of ‘stigmatisation’. 
(Stoerman, Posting on Stormfront, 11/05/2006 – own translation6)  
 
The discourses being produced on the Stormfront forum, as in other extreme 
right forums, were very controversial, wounding, insulting and disturbing even. 
Some of the postings I am reluctant to reproduce in this article, as they are 
deeply hurting and offensive. However, in order to make the case of 
transgressing discourses, I deem it necessary to include some of them here:  
 
‘Pfff, it doesn’t keep me from sleeping, the only thing I don’t understand 
is why he also shot a white child.’ (Watch Out, Posting on Stormfront, 
11/05/2006) 
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‘He could have at least taken out a few Jews as well. Antwerp is full 
of/stinks of Jews.’ (Hidrich, Posting on Stormfront, 13/05/2006) 
 
‘On moments such as these I hope that that prime minister of ours is 
shot by someone with an extreme right ideology.’ (NSDA-Pe, Posting 
on Stormfront, 12/05/2006) 
 
These discourses of hate and even of violence are not only provocative, but 
transgress several boundaries way beyond what is acceptable in a 
democracy, at least within a European and Belgian context. Because of this, 
some of these were reproduced in the mainstream media, both in newspapers 
and on TV. However, despite the public outcry this provoked, there is/was 
little or nothing the authorities could do about it. In the newspaper Gazet Van 
Antwerpen (GvA), Boonen, from Cyberhate, was quoted as saying:  
 
‘The internet reality is very complex. Stormfront is a good example of 
that. … that site, also the Dutch version, is fully operated from the US. 
Stormfront Flanders is in other words protected by the freedom of 
speech as described in the first amendment.’ (GvA, 2006) 
 
This exposure in the mainstream media, the subsequent public outcry and the 
formal complaints to Cyberhate impacted on the debate in the forum. Some 
became scared and sought re-assurances from others in the forum that their 
identity wouldn’t be revealed. Others bashed the media for its left-wing bias 
and lack of ‘objectivity’. One forum participant directly addressed the lurkers 
that came to visit the forum after the media reports. And finally, some also 
resisted and disassociated themselves from such comments. 
 
Seeking reassurances 
 
‘Do you think [blocking Stromfront] is possible? I hope not. SF is as a 
second home to me. Would they arrest members of this forum?’ 
(Farkasfarsang, Posting on Stormfront, 16/05/2006) 
 
Media Bashing 
 
This despicable newspaper [GvA], publishing anything except 
OBJECTIVE news, has to be forbidden immediately, they publish 
incomplete postings and thus halve truths. The author of this piece 
[containing quotes from Stormfront], the leftish sewage rat, must be 
hung with his head in the toilet and flushed away. (14Berserkr88, 
Posting on Stormfront, 16/05/2006) 
 
Addressing Lurkers 
 
Welcome dear occasional visitor, as you all can see the cowardly act of 
that one psychopath is being denounced unanimously. Sites as these 
have thus nothing to do with this whole affair. Of course the press 
would like you to believe otherwise and the left wants to exploit this 
event to realise their own agenda. By their bad policies and moral 
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decay they have created mentally deranged individuals such as this 
idiot. (Vlaamsche Leeuw, Posting on Stormfront, 16/05/2006) 
 
Resistance 
 
‘I’m sorry, but if the negative comments of some put us in a bad 
perspective, they are responsible for this themselves. If someone on 
this forum writes ‘I had to admit that I slept well thinking about that 
dead niggerwoman and that crying Turkish woman’ then he doesn’t 
have to complain that it appears in the newspaper. How do you want us 
to be taken seriously if you write something like that?’ (NoSugar, 
Posting on Stormfront, 16/05/2006) 
 
It is very apparent that many of the forum participants, as well as bloggers, 
claim it to be their given right in a democracy to say what they say. At several 
instances the essentialist and wounding discourses they produce are 
considered to be ‘real’ freedom of speech. This is juxtaposed to a fake semi-
freedom of speech, one participant even referred to the Orwellian thought-
police (thinkpol).  
 
The fascist identity and ideology of the forum is, among others, exposed by 
this double standard: On the one hand freedom of speech in invoked to 
promote hate speech, but on the other hand those voices in the public space 
that disagree or counter their discourses, such as journalists in the 
mainstream media and politicians, need to be censored and/or eliminated.  
 
4.2.3 Death Guido Demoor (24/06/2006) 
 
Again a month later, an employee of the national railway company died after 
having aggressed a young guy of North-African descent in a local bus in 
Antwerp. The youngsters were noisy and arguing amongst themselves when 
Guido Demoor intervened, not only verbally, but also physically, grabbing one 
of the youngsters, upon which some in the group turned on him. Post-mortem 
examinations showed that Guido Demoor died of a cerebral haemorrhage 
induced by the skirmish. Humo, a weekly (progressive) magazine revealed, 
however, that Guido Demoor was an extreme right activist and that his house 
was decorated with Nazi paraphernalia (De Coninck, 2006). Witnesses also 
claimed the youngsters were provoked by Demoor’s aggressive behaviour.  
 
This incident again fired up conflictual debates regarding the multi-cultural 
society in North-Belgium. One blog in particular was particularly blunt in its 
immediate and passionate response to what had happened. Vrij van Zegel 
[Free of Stamp Duty] is a blog by Luc van Balberghe. He claims to provide ‘a 
personal perspective on the news and asking questions the media don’t 
(can’t) ask anymore.’ (see: http://www.vrijvanzegel.net/), thereby positioning 
himself within the anti-media frame of the extreme right.  
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Figure 3: Screen-Shot of the blog ‘Vrij Van Zegel’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://www.vrijvanzegel.net (Retrieved 10/11/2007) 
 
When the news broke of Guido Demoor’s unfortunate death, Van Balberghe 
posted a very emotional and long message on his blog. Below a short 
excerpt: 
 
In Antwerp, every decent educated white person is about to burst of 
(for now) repressed anger. Anger, about vermin that thinks the city is 
theirs. Anger, about so much powerlessness because every well 
thinking human in this country has to keep shut and bow passively for 
the foreign leeches. (Van Balberghe, 2006a – own translation and 
emphasis added) 
 
In the same post he also uses an allegory – equating foreigners with ants that 
need to be annihilated, not by using DDT (a chemical poison), but by burning 
them, effectively exterminating them. This disturbing reference to Nazi-
Germany, as well as the words used in the quote above, again depict and 
essentialise a particular group in society as subhuman, legitimating its 
annihilation. It re-enforces the construction of a ‘we’ - the white population, 
defenseless, victimised, but righteous, civilised and of ‘the other’ as parasites, 
animals, legitimate to be eradicated. In a study of US anti-immigrant 
discourses, Santa Ana (1999: 192) identified ‘IMMIGRANTS ARE ANIMALS’ 
as one of the most powerful and dominant metaphors being adopted. It is thus 
not uncommon to find such ‘moral ordering’ in racist discourses (Lakoff, 1996: 
81). 
 
A reader of the blog and prominent member of the youth section of Vlaams 
Belang, reacted to Van Balberghe’s posting by stating: ‘Marvelous these 
uncensored weblogs that slowly but surely destroy the authority and 
powerbase of the regime-press!‘ (Evert Hardeman, reaction to post Van 
Balberghe, 2006a – own translation), re-enforcing the anti-media frame. 
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However, after newspaper articles (De Morgen, 2006c) and a complaint being 
filed through the CGKR7, Van Balberghe edited his blog. He replaced the 
words ‘vermin’ and ‘leeches’ by ‘youngsters’ and removed the ants allegory all 
together. Some months later, he posted another contribution called ‘Next 
year, a dictatorship?’ in which he denied being a racist, attacked the 
government and depicted the CGKR as resembling the Gestapo.  
 
In fact, Van Balberghe, as many others in the extreme right movement do, 
turns the tables on their ideological enemies by constructing them discursively 
as fascists, as a genuine threat to ‘real’ democracy, claiming their democratic 
right to be a racist. ‘[They] are a danger for democracy, for a healthy society. 
They belong to a group that, in the US, would not have the freedom to curtail 
free speech.’ (Van Balberghe, 2006b – own translation) 
 
This raises the question again as to what constitutes freedom of speech and 
how this should be balanced with other democratic rights. This is not merely 
an ethical discussion, but also a practical one. Where do we as a democracy 
draw the line between what is deemed acceptable and not, define how 
different rights are positioned vis-à-vis each other. And then, decide what can 
be done if these conventions are transgressed. Should something be done 
about it?  
 
Conclusion 
 
As has been shown by recent research into progressive movements, the 
internet allows dispersed activists to link-up and interact, superseding 
boundaries such as space and time, creating subaltern spaces of 
communication (della Porta and Tarrow, 2004; Kahn and Kellner, 2004; 
Cammaerts, 2005). Likewise, for (post-)fascist, fundamentalist, and other 
‘repressive’ movements the same applies. Radical, marginalised and 
atomised groups of people, often politically isolated, are able to link up 
through the internet in small communities of like-minded, such as could be 
witnessed in the Stormfront forum. Especially the comments of 
Farkasfarsang, calling the forum ‘his second home’, were pertinent in this 
regard.  
 
However, in a context where a powerful extreme right actively propagates 
such racist ideologies, both implicitly and explicitly, this becomes another 
issue altogether. And it is here that the limits of a radical plurality of voices 
within a democracy expose themselves. It is therefore to some extent 
understandable that some Belgian politicians from left to right, from federalists 
to nationalists are calling for more pro-active government intervention 
regarding online hate speech, preferably at a European level of governance. 
Of course, given the deeply offensive and repulsive nature of many of the 
comments being made online and the context in which they were produced, it 
is difficult to remain neutral here; rational detachment is not an option. Such 
vitriolic discourses should make any democratic person angry, demanding 
that something be done about this. The question remains what that something 
then is. Whilst laws and regulation or even technical solutions might be able to 
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remove some of these discourses from the public space, therefore the ideas 
and ideology behind these discourses have not disappeared from the political.  
 
It might be useful in this regard to briefly recount Butler’s (1997) work on 
‘excitable speech’ in which she uses Foucault’s History of Sexuality to argue 
that forbidding hate-speech all together through (state) censorship above all 
aids in proliferating these discourses further throughout society. This can also 
be related to what Mouffe calls the inherently conflictual nature of the political. 
Butler is not per se against limitations to the freedom of speech, but points to 
the need to be aware of the difficulties of combating hate speech through 
legal measures and the practical consequences of this. She refers to difficult 
questions such as: who defines what is hurtful, offensive, wounding or 
injurious speech and what is the context in which such language is being 
used? But whilst there might be an overall consensus that the discourses 
being discussed in this paper are totally unacceptable and do not belong in a 
democracy, not even from the perspective of a radical democracy or 
pluralism, the question of where and how we draw the line as a democracy 
between what is acceptable within a pluralist perspective and what is not? 
And how is this then implemented and enforced? 
 
Internet filtering and monitoring remain technical and policy options when it 
comes to combating hate speech on the internet. However, active censorship 
in a democracy tends to backfires in several ways. In relation to this case 
study, it could be argued that democracy might lose out in two ways. First, 
anti-democratic forces are able to construct democratic parties and institutions 
as ‘undemocratic’ on a continuous basic, claiming that they suppress ‘the true 
thoughts of the people’, using in effect the formal rules of democracy to 
destroy democratic culture - arguing for a democratic right to be a racist. 
Second, how to guarantee that once a regime of content control online is in 
place, it will not be used to silence other voices that at some future moment in 
time are considered to be undesirable by a majority? And do we really want 
content on the internet controlled, monitored and filtered on a permanent 
basis?  
 
This is, however, by no means a plea for complacency and/or ignorance, but 
to carefully think through the implications of intervention to exclude voices 
from public spaces of communication and interaction all together. Efforts to 
combat the incitement of hatred through democratic and legal ways should be 
encouraged, ‘in order to to secure a minimum of civility’ (Rosenfeld, 2001: 63). 
Exposure in the mainstream media of those that produce such discourses and 
formal legal complaints by racism watchdogs are important and fairly effective 
tools for achieving that (except when anonymity is invoked). The 
embracement of censorship of online content by democratic societies in 
addition to this, would not only represent crossing the rubicon, but also 
focuses merely on removing some of the symptoms of racism, not the root 
causes of it.  
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Notes: 
                                     
1 See OpenNet Initiative - URL: http://opennet.net/ 
2 See URL: http://www.stormfront.org/forum/showthread.php/joe-van-holsbeeck-
287572.html  
3 See URL: http://www.stormfront.org/forum/showthread.php/belgische-tiener-
vermoord-om-mp3-285800p3.html 
4 See URL: http://www.stormfront.org/forum/showthread.php/belgische-tiener-
vermoord-om-mp3-285800p3.html 
5 See URL: http://www.stormfront.org/forum/showthread.php/belgische-tiener-
vermoord-om-mp3-285800p4.html 
6 This as well as other quotes in this part can be found on: 
http://www.stormfront.org/forum/showthread.php?t=293314 
7 Sofie D’Huster (e-mail interview, 21/05/2007) states that a formal complaint has 
been transferred to the Federal Police on the basis of the Belgian anti-racism 
legistation (1981) for incitement to racism. The case is still pending.  
